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NOTES
AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO THE "PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL": JUDICIAL GREEN LIGHT
TO PRIVATE LITIGATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A new exception to the traditional refusal of the American legal
system to award attorneys' fees to victorious litigants is currently emerg-
ing in the federal courts. Predicated upon the desire to encourage liti-
gation aimed at vindicating strong national policies, a number of federal
courts will now award counsel fees to those plantiffs who have pursued
certain types of public interest actions to a successful conclusion.'
The implications of this new exception would seem to be of con-
siderable significance. Traditionally, enforcement of those federal laws
designed to protect broad public interests has depended almost exclu-
sively upon the efforts of the United States Attorney General's office
and various administrative agencies. Although considerable efforts
have been channeled through these public instrumentalities, the inher-
ent limitations of restricted funding, heavily centralized bureaucratic or-
ganization and, in many instances, direct conflicts of interest, have sub-
stantially impaired their overall effectiveness. 2  By eliminating the main
obstacle to private litigation in the public interest-the prohibitive ex-
pense of hiring legal counsel 3-these federal courts have made it pos-
sible for public-minded individuals to supplement the efforts of public
enforcement agencies, and to do so free of the constraints of those polit-
ically dependent bodies.
1. See, e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern-
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D.
Haw. 1972); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1972); Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); NAACP v. Allen, 340
F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
2. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP at 9 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
19, 1972).
3. In addition to the monetary obstacle, two major legal hurdles may also effec-
tively bar pro bono litigation by private individuals, namely, the question of "stand-
ing," see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and the question of whether
the statute in question allows for a private, as opposed'to public, right of action
based upon its violation. Compare, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327
F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), with J.!. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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The social value of encouraging pro bono litigation in this manner
is manifest: substantially increasing the enforcement potential of our
country's civil laws will naturally lead to an accelerated realization of
the policies behind these laws, and, in the broader context, a far
greater ability to respond to the perceived needs and desires of society.
This note will examine the legal conceptualization and practical appli-
cation of the still embryonic "private attorney general" fee shifting doc-
trine. Specifically it will chronicle the judicial generation of the new
rule, examine the latest group of cases which have relied upon it to
shift the plaintiff's attorney expenses to the losing defendant, suggest
additional conceptual and substantive refinements which might facili-
tate effectuation of the rule's underlying policy, and analyze the rea-
soning of the only federal decision to date which has expressly es-
chewed its application.
Emergence of the New Fee Shifting Rationale
The Historical Backdrop of Fee Shifting in the Federal Courts
Traditionally it has been the rule in the United States that attor-
neys' fees are not assessable against the losing litigant either in the form
of court costs or as part of the prevailing party's damages award.4
Rather, each party generally has been left to bear for himself the
expenses of retaining legal counsel. As with most generalizations in the
law, however, the rule against fee shifting has been riddled with various
exceptions. These may be divided into two general categories: those
exceptions promulgated by statute and those created by the courts pur-
suant to their general equity powers.
Statutory exceptions are patterned according to two basic proto-
types. The first type of statute requires automatic transferance of fees
and typically provides that "[i]f the petitioner shall finally prevail [in
an action brought pursuant to the statute] he shall be allowed a reason-
4. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In
Fleischmann Chief Justice Warren pointed out that "[i]n support of the American rule,
it has been argued that since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized
for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly dis-
couraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing in-
cluded the fees of their opponents' counsel .... Also, the time, expense, and difficul-
ties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's
fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration." Id. at 718. Many
commentators, on the other hand, have argued in favor of the English practice of award-
ing attorneys' fees to the prevailing litigant in almost all civil suits. See Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75
(1963); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 COLO.
L. REV. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?,
20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
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able attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as part of the costs of the
suit."5  In contrast to these mandatory provisions, several federal stat-
utes confer discretionary power upon the courts to shift counsel fees to
the prevailing litigant. Statutes of this later variety may in some cases
restrict the court's discretion by detailing various guidelines on which
the court must make its determination.6
The second major source of exceptions to the basic no-fee-shifting
rule has been the general equity powers of the federal judiciary. In
commenting upon this inherent authority, Justice Frankfurter noted:
Allowance of [attorneys'] costs in appropriate situations is part
of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The suits
"in equity" of which these courts were given "cognizance" ever
since the First Judiciary Act, constituted that body of remedies,
procedures and practices which theretofore had been evolved in the
English Court of Chancery, subject, of course, to modifications by
Congress. . . . The sources bearing on eighteenth-century Eng-
lish practice-reports and manuals-uniformly support the power
not only to give a fixed allowance for the various steps in a suit,
what are known as costs "between party and party," but also as
much of the entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties
as fair justice to the other party will permit, technically known as
costs "between solicitor and client."'7
Although this general power to award attorneys' fees has thus re-
sided within the federal court system for some time, in practice it has
been used relatively sparingly and usually only within the confines of
certain well established exceptions to the general rule. In fact, until re-
cently only two such exceptions have accounted for the great majority
of cases in which the courts have deemed it appropriate to award fees.
The first of these may be termed the vexatious or unreasonable con-
duct rule. Under this rationale the courts have awarded fees to a liti-
gant where his opponent has pursued an unfounded action or defense
and has done so "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons."" The obvious purpose for awarding attorney fees in such a
case is to protect the honest litigant and to discourage abuse of the court
system.
5. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921); id.
§ 499g(b) (Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act of 1930); 45 U.S.C. § 153(p)
(1970) (Railway Labor Act of 1926); 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970) (Interstate Corn-
merce Act of 1887).
6. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (Securities Act of 1933, allowing the court
to award attorneys' fees if it "believes the suit or the defense to have been without
merit .... "); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) (patent infingement suits, allowing the court
to award attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases"); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (Fair
Housing Act of 1968, allowing the court to award fees provided that the plaintiff "in
the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees").
7. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939).
8. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACCE 1 54.77[2] at 1709 (2d ed. 1971).
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The second major court created exception, customarily referred to
as the "common fund" doctrine, is premised upon the desire to avoid
the unjust enrichment of others at the sole expense of the person who
has provided them with a benefit. The basic rule may be summarized
as follows: Where an individual, through his own litigative efforts, has
protected or created a fund in which others have a beneficial interest,
he normally will be awarded litigation expenses, including attorneys'
fees, either from the fund itself or from some kindred source over which
the court has jurisdiction to assess the beneficiaries for a share of the
expenses proportionate to their interestsY
Application of the common fund doctrine is well illustrated by the
frequently cited case of Trustees v. Greenough.1" There the plaintiff, a
bondholder in the Florida Railway Company, brought suit on behalf
of himself and all other holders of similar bonds against the present and
former trustees of a fund which had been pledged inter alia for the pay-
ment of the interest accruing on the bonds. The bill charged that the
trustees were wasting and destroying the fund by selling the trust prop-
erty at a nominal price, and that in addition the trustees refused to
provide for the payment of interest on the bonds. Plaintiff pursued the
action to a successful conclusion and in so doing "secured and saved"
a large portion of the trust fund. In addition, as the result of plain-
tiff's efforts, similarly situated bondholders were able to realize divi-
dend payments which prior to the suit had been substantially in arrears.
Against this background, then, the Court determined that it was ap-
propriate to award the plaintiff attorneys' fees from the fund which he
had protected:
[I]n a case like the present, where the bill was filed not only in be-
half of the complainant himself but in behalf of the other bond-
holders having an equal interest in the fund; and where the bill
sought to rescue that fund from waste and destruction . . . and to
bring it into court for administration according to the purposes of
the trust: and where all this has been done; and done at great ex-
pense and trouble on the part of the complainant; and the other
bondholders have come in and participated in the benefits resulting
from his proceedings-if the complainant is not a trustee, he has
at least acted the part of a trustee in relation to the common inter-
est. . . . It would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to
the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund
an unfair advantage. He has worked for them as well as for him-
self; if he cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself, they ought
to contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he has fairly
incurred. To make them a charge upon the fund is the most
equitable way of securing such contribution."
9. Id.
10. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
11. Id.at532.
MIo. 24
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The Movement Toward a New Fee Shifting Rationale
The three basic fee shifting exceptions discussed above--express
statutory provision, the vexatious conduct rule and the "common fund"
doctrine-have, until the emergence of the new "private attorney gen-
eral" exception, with which this note is concerned, accounted for the
great bulk of the fee transferring which has occurred in the federal
courts. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the courts have adhered to
the general American rule of denying any award of fees to either of the
litigants. The law was by no means completely rigid, however, and al-
though the fundamental exceptions were retained as general guidelines,
the courts managed to express their expanding notions of equity by in-
creasingly liberalizing the bounds of these exceptions. Since these pre-
liminary departures manifest much of the judicial sentiment which ul-
timately led to the "private attorney general" doctrine, it may be worth-
while to consider briefly a few of the more salient trends and cases.
Expanding Notions of Bad Faith
The expansion of the vexatious and unreasonable conduct excep-
tion is perhaps best illustrated by a series of relatively recent school de-
segregation cases. The primary introduction of fee shifting into the
school desegregation area came in Bell v. School Board2 In that case
the lower court had granted plaintiffs request for injunctive relief aimed
at preventing further racial discrimination in his school district but had
denied an additional prayer for counsel fees. On appeal, the refusal
to award fees was reversed. The appellate court reasoned that such an
award was clearly justified in light of the school board's "long contin-
ued pattern of evasion and obstruction which included not only the de-
fendants' unyielding refusal to take any initiative, thus casting a heavy
burden on the children and their parents, but their interposing a variety
of administrative obstacles to thwart the valid wishes of the plaintiff
for a desegregated education."' 3  Bell thus constituted a rather classic
application of the unreasonable conduct rule.
In Clark v. Board of Education,14 decided three years after Bell,
the desire for a more flexible fee shifting rationale was plainly evident.
In that case, the court dealt with a pattern of resistance to school de-
segregation which was quite similar to that evidenced in Bell. The
trial court in Clark, however, had granted plaintiff an award of attor-
neys' fees but only in the seemingly token amount of $250. The court
of appeals reluctantly affirmed, stating that "[w]hile we believe addi-
tional fees were warranted, we do not believe that this is such an extra-
12. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
13. Id. at 500.
14. 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
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ordinary case that we could validly hold that the trial court has abused
its discretion .. ."13 The court then went on to express its general
impatience with the injustice of forcing individuals into court in order
to vindicate clearly defined rights. In conclusion the court stated:
If well known constitutional guarantees continue to be ignored or
abridged and individual pupils are forced to resort to the courts
for protection, the time is fast approaching when additional sanc-
tion of substantial attorney fees should be seriously considered by
the trial courts. 16
Two years later, in Cato v. Parham,17 the admonition of the Clark
court was to some extent followed. In Cato the court noted that al-
though litigation aimed at ending the racial segregation in the defend-
ant's school district had dragged on for nine years, it did not "impugn
the Board's good faith in trying to carry out the [constitutional] man-
date. . . ."'I Despite this fact, however, the court pointed out that it
could not "be gainsaid that whatever progress has been made in the
direction of desegregation . . .has followed judicial prodding,""a and
awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $700.20 At a
minimum, Cato stood for a substantial expansion of the vexatious con-
duct rule. Bad faith on the part of the defendant, a traditional pre-
requisite of fee shifting under this rationale, was largely dispensed with.
Instead, all that the court appeared to require was a showing that the
defendant had precipitated litigation which should not have been nec-
essary. In making this implicit ruling, then, the court significantly lib-
eralized fee shifting policy: emphasis was no longer to be placed ex-
clusively on the misconduct of the defendant; rather fees might also be
awarded to alleviate the patent unfairness in making a citizen incur a
heavy financial burden in order to realize a clearly defined constitu-
tional right. Beyond inaugurating this new shift in policy, however, the
court also exhibited a prescience of the further fee shifting developments
which were soon to take place by citing as "suggestive" the then very
recent Supreme Court decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises.21
The question in Piggie Park was what criteria should determine
whether an attorney's fee award was justified in a suit under Title II
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.22 This act provides that:
15. Id. at 671.
16. Id.
17. 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), aij'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968).
18. Id. at 1378.
19. Id.
20. This amount was intended to compensate the plaintiffs for counsel fees in-
curred only during the last several months of the suit. Fees incurred before Septem-
ber 1967 were apparently deemed to be nonrecoverable under the law which existed
prior to that time.
21. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). This title of the act prohibits discrimination or
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In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private per-
son.
23
The court of appeals apparently regarded the discretion to award fees
granted by the statute as adding very little to the discretion which al-
ready existed in the courts under the traditional bad faith rule and in-
structed the district court accordingly. 24 The Supreme Court, however,
did not agree. Instead it found that the attorney's fee provision of Ti-
tle II was meant not simply to penalize bad faith litigants, but also to
encourage private enforcement of high priority congressional policies.
The Court reasoned as follows:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have
to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form
only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he can-
not recover damages. If he obtains an injunction he does so not
for himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicat-
ing a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attor-
neys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance
the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-
not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance argu-
ments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage
individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief
under Title H.
It follows that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction
under that Title should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust. 25
With this language, then, the Court gave birth to an entirely new
fee shifting rationale. The fact that the opinion was extremely brief
and that it was addressed solely to the Civil Rights Act may have ini-
tially obscured its full potential but, in any event, it was not long be-
fore its true germinal possibilities were in full bloom. 26
Expansion of -the "Common Fund" Doctrine
As discussed previously, the "fund" doctrine received its impetus
from the courts' desire to avoid unjust enrichments and under the
segregation in places of public accommodation based upon race, color, religion or na-
tional origin.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
24. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
25. 390 U.S. at 401-02.
26. See text accompanying notes 36-92 infra.
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Trustees v. Greenough formulation of the rule,27 the necessary ingre-
dients were essentially a suit which devolved pecuniary benefits upon a
class of persons and jurisdiction over a fund which made it possible for
the court to spread the costs of litigation among the beneficiary class.
In 1970 the Supreme Court, taking its cue from certain state court
decisions, greatly expanded the scope of this exception by holding that
the benefit accruing to the enriched class need not be monetary in na-
ture.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.2" was an action by shareholders
of the Electric Auto-Lite Company to dissolve the merger of their com-
pany with the Mergenthaler Linotype Company. Plaintiffs alleged that
the merger vote had been materially influenced by a misleading proxy
statement which had violated rule 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.29 After successive appeals the Supreme Court found for the
plaintiffs on the merits and remanded the case to the district court to
determine what relief might be appropriate. In addition, however, the
Court turned its attention to plaintiffs request for an interim award of
attorneys' fees. The Court first reasoned that he request for attorneys'
fees was not improper simply because plaintiffs had sued under a fed-
eral statute which made no express provision for such an award." In-
stead, the Court felt that the crucial inquiry was whether the common
fund doctrine might be applied in a case where the benefit accruing
from petitioner's action was not of a pecuniary nature. The Court de-
cided that it could. Justice Harlan reasoned, in essence, that the unjust
enrichment rationale of the "fund" rule was not rendered invalid
invalid merely because the benefit to the shareholders was not capable
of monetary valuation; rather, the doctrine remained basically opera-
tive so long as any "substantial benefit" was passed on to the share-
holders.3 1  In defining "substantial benefit" Justice Harlan initially re-
27. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
28. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
30. In this regard pains were taken to distinguish the case of Fleischmann Dis-
tilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In Fleischmann the Court
had considered the appropriateness of awarding attorneys' fees in trademark infringe-
ment actions brought under the Lanham Act. This act "meticulously detailed"
both the injunctive and compensatory remedies available in suits brought under its au-
thority but made no mention whatsoever of attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
The Court ruled that the thoroughness of the remedies which had been provided by the
act manifested a congressional intent to limit the courts' remedial powers to those
specific remedies. Accordingly, the Court held attorneys' fees could not be awarded.
The Mills Court stated that it did not consider Fleischmann controlling since the ex-
press remedies provided by the Securities Exchange Act were, in comparison to the Lan-
ham Act, only minimal. 396 U.S. at 391.
31. 396 U.S. at 392-95.
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lied upon Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Association,32
where the Minnesota Supreme Court had held that:
[A] substantial benefit must be something more than technical in
its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which cor-
rects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights
and interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protec-
tion of an essential right to the stockholders' interest.33
Nevertheless, in discussing the specific service which plaintiffs allegedly
had rendered to the Electric Auto-Lite Company, the Court used lan-
guage which seemingly possessed far greater import than the innocuous
sounding test established by Bosch.
[T]he stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and in-
formed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicat-
ing the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial serv-
ice to the corporation and its shareholders. . . . Whether peti-
tioners are successful in showing a need for significant relief may be
a factor in determining whether a further award should later be
made. But regardless of the relief granted, private stockholder's
actions of this sort "involve Corporate therapeutics," and furnish
a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of
enforcement of the proxy statute.34
This rationale was indeed a far cry from the traditional fund doc-
trine. Not only was no fund protected or brought into being, but con-
ceivably the corporation might have received no benefit whatsoever
other than the "general therapeutics" of enhanced law enforcement,
and this "benefit" was largely shared by stockholders of all corpora-
tions. As such, the award of fees in Mills may be construed as being
based upon the conferral of benefits to the public at large and not
merely to the shareholders of the Electric Auto-Lite Corporation; the
language is somewhat ambiguous but the potential for such an inter-
pretation clearly is present.35  Thus, while the Court may have in-
tended to award fees on the basis of a somewhat liberalized common
fund doctrine, its ultimate holding suggested a far different rationale.
32. 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
33. Id. at 366-67, 101 N.W.2d at 427.
34. 396 U.S. at 396 [emphasis added].
35. The legitimacy of such an interpretation is further supported by one com-
mentator who wrote: "In accepting the rulings of Abrams and Bosch, together with
the Hornstein terminology, the Mills Court legitimized a stockholder's suit fee excep-
tion based solely on law enforcement policy considerations. The Court was con-
cerned not with the benefit of this suit to these shareholders, but with the benefit
of this type of suit to the public interest...." Note, The Allocation of Attorneys'
Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 327 (1971). The
same writer also pointed out that more than fifty percent of Electric Auto-Lite's
shareholders were, in fact, opposed to the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act's
regulations. Id. at 333. See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145
(5th Cir. 1971), which is discussed in the text accompanying note 47 infra.
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Exactly how the lower courts would construe Mills, however, remained to
be seen.
The Formal Break with Tradition
In Mills and Piggie Park the federal courts were confronted by two
related departures from the traditional exceptions to the no-fee-shifting
rule. That is, each case appeared to allot the prevailing plaintiff attor-
neys' fees based primarily upon his vindication of congressional policy.
Granting that each case, on its face, operated within a relatively narrow
ambit-Piggie applying directly only to the specific fee granting discre-
tion provided by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Mills only
to shareholders suits brought under section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act-nonetheless, in juxtaposition the two cases strongly sug-
gested a new rationale for a generally applicable exception. In a series
of three cases decided shortly after Mills this suggestion was extensively
considered and in at least two instances followed.
Bradley v. School Board3" was a school desegregation action which
was originally decided on May 26, 1971, by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Although this opinion was
later reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,3 7 it con-
tinues to merit scrutiny as the first decision to coalesce the Piggie Park
and Mills rulings into an entirely novel fee shifting rule. Bradley was
a class action which had continued over the course of sixteen years in
an attempt to end racial segregation in the public schools of Richmond,
Virginia. The attitude of the Richmond school board during those
years was aptly characterized by the court as follows: "At each stage
of the proceedings the School Board's position has been that, given the
choice between desegregating the schools and committing a contempt
of court, they would choose the first, but that in any event desegrega-
tion would only come about by court order."38 As a result of this type
of opposition the plaintiffs were forced to maintain legal pressure on
the school board members until they finally submitted an acceptable
desegregation plan.
Following the court's implementation of this plan, plaintiffs filed
a motion for the additional relief of attorneys' fees. Since the action
had been brought under 42 U.S.C. section 198311 which made no ex-
press mention of such fees, the court was forced to consider its ability
to grant plaintiffs' request on the basis of its general equity powers.
36. 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972).
37. The opinion of the Fourth Circuit reversing the district court decision seems
quite unsound; it is discussed separately in the text accompanying notes 105-135 infra.
38. 53 F.R.D. at 39.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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In doing so it exhaustively reviewed the traditional equity tests for shift-
ing fees and concluded first, that the fund theory was an inappropriate
rationale for this type of suit:
School desegregation cases, or any suits against governmental bod-
ies, do not fit this fund model without considerable cutting and
trimming. This is a class suit to be sure, with class relief, but to
say that the plaintiff class will actually in effect pay their attorneys
if the school board is made to pay counsel fees entails a number of
unproved assumptions about the extent of which pupils pay for
their free public schooling. 40
The court next turned to the bad faith test and concluded that it was a
valid basis for awarding fees in this case. The court stated that
"[w]hen parties must institute litigation to secure what is plainly due
them, it is not unfair to characterize a defendant's conduct as obstinate
and unreasonable. .. .
The court was not content, however, to base its award of fees
solely upon this finding. Rather, it went on to fashion an alternative
ground for its holding. In creating this independent ground for award-
ing fees the court looked first to Piggie Park and suggested that the
same policy factors which had prompted the Supreme Court's decision
in that case often were present in even greater degree in school deseg-
regation litigation.42  For example, desegregation suits are, like Title
If actions, of a quasi-public nature. This is so, the court implied, not
only because school discrimination suits generally are brought as class
actions and therefore affect the rights of many individuals but also be-
cause they serve to implement the "vital" governmental policy that civil
rights in the schools "be protected" and in fact immediately vindi-
cated.43 Furthermore, the court noted that although the national goal
of school integration had been partially enforced by administrative pro-
ceedings, a large share of the burden of implementing school integra-
tion had fallen on the courts in the form of suits brought by private in-
dividuals.
Interestingly, the Bradley court seemed to go beyond the basic ra-
tionale of the Piggie Park holding-namely, that attorneys' fees should
be awarded to plaintiffs as a means of encouraging certain types of liti-
gation-to apparently suggest that the attorneys who handle these ac-
tions should be considered primarily in the service of 'the court, instead
of their respective clients, and therefore should not have to look to the
private litigants at all for their compensation:
The private lawyer in [school desegregation suits] most
40. 53 F.R.D. at 35-36.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Id. at 41.
43. Id. at 41-42.
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accurately may be described as a "private attorney general."
Whatever the conduct of defendants may have been, it is intolera-
bly anomalous that counsel entrusted with guarantying the effectu-
ation of a public policy of non-discrimination as to a large propor-
tion of citizens should be compelled to look to himself or to private
individuals for the resources needed to make his proof ...
Where the interests of so many are at stake, justice demands
that the plaintiffs' attorneys be equipped to inform the court of the
consequences of available choices; this can only be done if the
availability of funds for representation is not left to chance. 44
In Bradley, then, the court's position is apparently that plaintiffs' coun-
sel should be compensated by the state rather than by either of the par-
ties to the action. This was indeed a novel departure from standard
concepts in fee shifting. Nevertheless, since a state agency was a de-
fendant to the action, and hence, under traditional fee shifting, the state
would also have sustained the burden of plaintiff's attorneys' fees, the
full potential impact of the Bradley holding was not apparent. Aside
from this fact, the district court opinion in Bradley did stand une-
quivocally for a broad application of the basic Piggie Park rationale.
Regardless of whether statutory authority to shift fees existed, the pol-
icy of encouraging the vindication of strong governmental interests was
an appropriate basis upon which to do so.
In Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 5 decided less than a month
after Bradley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
dealt with the question of attorneys' fees in the context of a suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. section 1982.4" This statute, like section 1983 with
which the Bradley court was faced, makes no express provision for
awarding attorneys' fees. The facts of the case presented a clear cut in-
stance of racial discrimination. Southern Home Sites, a Mississippi
company engaged in the business of real estate development, was run-
ning a campaign to develop a site near Ocean Springs, Mississippi. As
part of its campaign Southern had mailed form letters in which it had
offered to sell to the recipient a lot purportedly worth $600 for $49.50
in cash; the only condition for eligibility was that the buyer "be a mem-
ber of the white race." Lee, a black man, received one of the promo-
tional letters and tendered an offer of $49.50 to Southern. Southern
refused to accept and Lee brought suit.
In the district court Lee succeeded in securing an injunction against
future discrimination by the defendant; however, his additional motion
44. Id. at 42.
45. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. This statute originally was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It
provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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for an award of counsel fees was refused. The court reasoned that
since the statute did not provide for such an award and since Southern's
defense against Lee's suit had not been sufficiently "malicious, oppres-
sive or so unreasonable and obdurately obstinate" to call the "vexa-
tious conduct" rule into play, no award of fees was justified.
On appeal the district court's denial of fees was reversed. The
appellate court noted in passing that in view of certain facts bad faith
could be attributed to defendant's continued litigation after a certain
point in the proceedings; however, it chose to base its holding upon a
"broader ground"-namely, that awarding attorneys' fees is an appro-
priate means for the federal courts to use in effectuating congressional
policy. In justifying this holding the court relied principally on Mills,
Piggie Park and certain federal statutes which allowed the award of
attorneys' fees and which the court felt embodied legislative policies
which were closely analagous to those supporting section 1982. Look-
ing first to Mills, the court acknowledged that, at least formally, the deci-
sion had spoken in terms of shareholder's suits and the unjust enrich-
ment rationale. Nevertheless, by turning to the more expansive con-
struction to which the Mills decision is susceptible, the court reasoned
that the decision "is better understood as resting heavily on its ac-
knowledgement. . that private suits are necessary to effectuate con-
gressional policy and that awards of attorney's fees are necessary to
encourage private litigants to initiate such suits."'47  The court then
concluded that "here as in Mills there is a strong congressional policy
behind the rights declared in section 1982. Awarding attorney's fees
to successful plaintiffs would facilitate the enforcement of that policy
through private litigation. '48
For additional support of its holding, the court looked to other
federal acts which it regarded as embodying policies similar to those
implemented by section 1982, and which expressly provided for the
award of attorneys' fees. These included the Fair Housing Law49 and
the Public Accommodations and Equal Employment Opportunities sec-
tions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.50 The court argued that "[i]n
fashioning an effective remedy for the rights declared by Congress one
hundred years ago, courts should look not only to the policy of the
enacting Congress but also to the policy embodied in closely related
legislation. Courts work interstitially in an area such as this." 51 In
final abutment of its decision the court turned to Piggie Park. After
quoting extensively from that opinion, the court concluded: "To en-
47. 444 F.2d at 145.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
50. Id. § 2000a-3(b), § 2000e-5k (1970).
51. 444 F.2d at 146.
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sure that individual litigants are willing to act as 'private attorneys gen-
eral' to effectuate the public purposes of the statute, attorney's fees
should be as available as under [the Fair Housing Act]. '"2 Thus Lee,
like the district court opinion in Bradley, proceeded upon the rationale
that private suits were a valid and indeed necessary means of enforcing
certain congressional policies and that awarding attorneys' fees there-
fore was justified as a means of encouraging such enforcement.
The third opinion to consider the new fee shifting rationale in
some detail was the Fourth Circuit case of Brewer v. School Board.53
In this case plaintiffs had brought suit to contest the adequacy of a
revised plan of desegregation which had been approved by the dis-
trict court. The court of appeals dismissed all of plaintiffs' attacks on
the plan except one: its failure to provide free bus transportation to
pupils who were assigned to schools beyond walking distance from
their homes. On this point the court was persuaded by plaintiffs' argu-
ment that such transportation was a necessary incident to any plan for
school integration. Forcing the reassigned students to ride the public
bus system, the plaintiffs had urged, would impose an "unreasonable,
if not an intolerable burden" upon a substantial number of the affected
families. In response to these arguments the court ordered the school
board to provide free transportation for the students who were assigned
to schools outside their neighborhoods.
The court next focused its attention on plaintiff's request for at-
torneys' fees. Since the section of the civil rights laws under which
plaintiffs had sued did not provide for attorneys' fees awards,5 4 the
court looked to the various equity rules. Application of the bad faith
exception was rejected on the ground that the court found no "com-
pelling circumstances" to overturn the district court's finding that the
board had made "a good faith effort at desegregation." Also, in a
lengthy footnote, the court said that the private attorney general doc-
trine would not seem to apply in school desegregation cases.53 In
reaching this conclusion the court characterized Lee and Miller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 6 a case which essentially had duplicated
the Piggie Park holding, as resting primarily upon a specific need to
privately enforce certain statutory rights. For example, the court stated
that the reason for the ruling in Lee "was that the right asserted by the
complainant, though involving public policy, 'under present judicial de-
velopment, depends entirely on private enforcement.' "7 In contrast
52. Id. at 148.
53. 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1970).
55. 456 F.2d at 950 n.22.
56. 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. 456 F.2d at 950 n.22.
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to Lee and Miller the court pointed out that in the school desegregation
area the United States Attorney General was empowered to pursue any
"meritorious" action on behalf of any person who, in the attorney gen-
eral's opinion, was unable to "bear the expense of the litigation." Fur-
thermore, the court noted, "the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has a responsibility to see that every school receiving any fed-
eral assistance (and, for practical purposes, it may be assumed all do)
is desegregated. '58
Finally, however, basing its decision upon what it termed a "quasi-
application of the 'common fund' doctrine," the court held that an
award of counsel fees to plaintiff was in fact justified. The court de-
lineated its reasoning as follows:
The students have secured a right [of free transportation] worth
approximately $60 per year to each of them. This pecuniary bene-
fit to the students involved would, under normal circumstances,
warrant the imposition of a charge against them for their propor-
tionate share of a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in securing
such pecuniary benefit for them. It is not practical, however, to
do this in this case and, too, to do so would defeat the basic pur-
pose of the relief provided by the amendment in the decree, which
was to secure for the student concerned transportation without cost
or deduction. The only feasible solution in this peculiar situation
would seem to lie in requiring the school district itself to supple-
ment its provision of free transportation with payment of an ap-
propriate attorney's fee to plaintiffs' attorneys for securing the addi-
tion of such a provision to the plan of desegregation. 59
This argument would indeed seem to stray far from the common
fund theory. In fact, the court would appear to expressly negate any
intent to achieve the basic purpose of the fund theory-the avoidance
of unjust enrichment. Instead it apparently reasoned that since plain-
tiffs had, in effect, conferred a pecuniary benefit upon their class, they
were entitled to have their attorneys' costs paid, if not by the benefi-
ciary class, then by the defendant. Any nexus between this reasoning
and the traditional fund doctrine is extremely tenuous to say the least.
In his special concurrence, Judge Winter, recognizing that there
were "grave" conceptual difficulties with the majority's reasoning,
looked to Piggie Park for a firmer basis for awarding fees. He as-
serted that the policy behind Piggie Park was directly applicable to
school desegregation cases, and in response to the majority's argument
that such policies were adequately protected by public enforcement
agencies, Judge Winter noted that
[d]espite the extensive enforcement responsibilities the statutes
place on the Departments of Justice and Health, Education and
58. Id. at 951-52.
59. Id.
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Welfare and their immense resources, we know from the cases
which come before us that they have been unable to shoulder the
entire burden of litigation to make Brown I fully effective. The
Department of Justice has not appeared in this stage of this very
case. 60
Judge Winter continued by observing that almost the entire financial
burden of the suit had fallen on plaintiffs and the nonprofit organiza-
tion which had provided plaintiffs with counsel. He concluded: "The
time is now when those who vindicate these civil rights should receive
fair and equitable compensation from the sources which have denied
them .... 61
Although it is apparent that the majority opinion in Brewer did
not promote the conceptual clarity of the emerging attorneys' fees law,
it did provide additional proof of two significant facts: first, that a
number of federal courts are strongly inclined to award attorneys fees
to prevailing complainants in some circumstances which are not cov-
ered by the traditional fee shifting rules; and second, that the courts
have been unable to settle upon a single fee shifting rationale which
would accommodate all of these inclinations. The law thus awaited
further developments.
Recent Applications of the New Exception
Against the background of Bradley, Lee and Brewer, four district
court cases very recently have been decided which have added both
clarity and new dimensions to the private attorney general concept in
fee shifting. The first of these, Sims v. Amos, 6 2 was decided March 17,
1972 by the federal district court for the middle district of Alabama.
There the question of attorneys' fees arose in the context of an action
to secure reapportionment of the state legislature. Plaintiffs had con-
tended that the Alabama legislature was malapportioned so as to deny
them their constitutional right to equal suffrage. The three judge dis-
trict court ruled that plaintiffs had proved their allegation and accord-
ingly ordered the implementation of plaintiffs' proposed reapportion-
ment plan.
The court found little difficulty in justifying an award of attor-
neys' fees to plaintiffs under the traditional bad faith test. It noted
that "[tihe history of the present litigation is replete with instances of
the Legislature's neglect of, and even total disregard for, its constitu-
tional obligation to reapportion. ' 63 In addition, the court pointed out
60. Id. at 954.
61. Id.
62. 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
63. Id. at 693-94.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
that bad faith might be attributed to the defendant's "submissions of
obviously unacceptable" reapportionment plans. The court, however,
chose to base its award of fees "on far broader considerations of
equity." Specifically, it looked to the precedents of Piggie Park, Mills,
Lee and Bradley,64 and rendered the following rule:
If, pursuant to this action, plaintiffs have benefited their class and
have effectuated a strong congressional policy, they are entitled to
attorneys' fees regardless of defendant's good or bad faith. Indeed,
under such circumstances, the award loses much of its discretionary
character and becomes a part of the effective remedy a court should
fashion to encourage public-minded suits ... and to carry out
congressional policy.65
In applying these criteria to the case before it the court was fully
satisfied that the plaintiffs had indeed functioned as private attorneys
general.
No other right is more basic to the integrity of our democractic so-
ciety than is the right plaintiffs assert here to free and equal suffer-
age. In addition, congressional policy strongly favors the vindica-
tion of federal rights violated under color of state law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and, more specifically, the protection of the right to a non-
discriminatory franchise. 60
Besides these considerations, the court also pointed out that courts
should encourage this particular type of private litigation since the ex-
penses are great and the chances of a substantial damage award are
minimal. "Consequently," the court concluded, "in order to attempt to
eliminate these impediments to pro bono publico litigation, such as is
here involved, and to carry out congressional policy, an award of attor-
neys' fees is essential."6
Sims' chief significance is found in the new formulation which it
gives to the private attorney general doctrine. Choosing not to rely
on any single precedent, the court apparently tried to coalesce the pri-
vate attorney general concept of Piggie Park and the benefit language
found in Mills. The conceptual success of the resulting hybrid formu-
lation would seem to be open to considerable doubt. Requiring a show-
ing of both statutory vindication and a class wide benefit, would seem
to entail a largely redundant demonstration. That is, in most cases the
act of vindicating congressional policy will ipso facto confer a benefit
upon plaintiff's class. In Sims, for example, vindication and benefit
both inhere in the single act of achieving equal apportionment.
64. The court's reliance upon these cases was express: "The present case clearly
falls among those meant to be encouraged under the principles articulated in Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc. and Mills, and expanded upon in Southern Home Sites and
Bradley." Id. at 694.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 695.
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Beyond this conceptual awkwardness, however, the absolute re-
quirement that there be a class benefit, in addition to the general vin-
dication of congressional policy, would seem to be an unnecessary re-
striction on the Piggie Park rationale. There the Supreme Court deter-
mined that awarding attorneys fees might be premised solely on the
ground that it was in the public interest to encourage the enforcement
of certain federal laws. No additional requirement that plaintiffs bene-
fit a particular class of individuals was deemed necessary. The Sims
formula, then, would seem to append a superfluous and unwarranted
prerequisite to the Piggie Park test.
Exactly one week after Sims was decided a court from the same
judicial district again used the private attorney general doctrine to award
counsel fees to the prevailing plaintiff. In NAACP v. Allen, 6 petition-
ers brought a class action alleging that the Alabama Departments of
Public Safety and Personnel had followed "a continuous and pervasive
pattern and practice of excluding Negroes from employment in the De-
partment of Public Safety."69  After finding for plaintiffs, the court
ordered inter alia that the defendants employ one black trooper for ev-
ery white trooper hired until approximately one-quarter of the Alabama
state troopers were black. In addition to this relief, the court, in a
supplemental order dated March 24, 1972, also taxed the cost of
plaintiffs' attorneys against the defendants." °
The justification of this award followed very closely the pattern
which had been set in Sims. Here, as in that case, the court first stated
that the fees could be shifted on the basis of defendants' "unreasonable
and obdurate conduct"; but again it chose to base its holding on the
broader foundation of the private attorney general doctrine. The court
also used essentially the same formulation of the doctrine that had been
used in Sims. Thus, it looked for, and found, both a benefit to plain-
tiffs class-i.e., increased employment opportunities and relief from the
"badge of opprobrium which necessarily attaches to a group excluded"
from particular types of employment on the basis of race 7 -and the
vindication of "strong" federal rights-namely, "the enforcement and
protection of the right of equal job opportunities. '7 2 Finally, the court
again sought to emphasize the need to positively encourage such suits
by pointing to their generally unremunerative nature and their potential
for subjecting plaintiffs' counsel to "social, politial and community"
ostracism. Allen thus constitutes a virtual duplication of the Sims
68. 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
69. Id. at 704.
70. Id. at 707-08.
71. Id. at 709.
72. Id. at 709-10.
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rationale. It reaches an admirable result, but again it does so on the
basis of a redundant and unnecessarily restrictive statement of the pri-
vate attorney general test.The third decision to apply the private attorney general concept
was Wyatt v. Strickney." In that case, an action was brought on behalf
of residents of the Partlow State School and Hospital for the mentally
retarded. Petitioners contended that the defendant hospital was being
operated in a manner which deprived the residents of their right to
have rehabilitative training and care which met minimum constitutional
standards. The court sustained plaintiffs' allegations and in a long and
detailed appendix to its holding delineated the minimum standards of
care and training which were to be afforded at the Partlow facility.
Then, in an opinion attached at the end of the appendix, the court con-
sidered the question of attorneys' fees.
Chief Judge Johnson, who had also written the Allen decision, be-
gan by holding that the evidence adduced at trial indicated sufficient
bad faith on the part of defendants to justify an award of fees to the
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, as in both Sims and Allen, the court went on
to find its primary fee shifting rationale in the realm of more expansive
policy considerations. Interestingly, in explicating the specific policy
factors which purportedly justified awarding fees to the plaintiffs, Judge
Johnson did not revert back to the hybrid tests of Sims and Allen. In-
stead he chose to break new ground by proceeding upon what he
termed "a kind of benefit theory." He explained:
Plaintiffs bringing suits to enforce a strong national policy often
benefit a class of people far broader than those actually involved
in the litigation. Such plaintiffs, who are said to act as "private
attorneys general" . . . rarely recover significant damage awards.
. . . Consequently, in order to eliminate the impediments to pro
bono publico litigation and to carry out congressional policy an
award of attorneys' fees not only is essential but also legally re-
quired. 74
This formulation of the rule marked two significant departures
from the test used in Allen and Sims. The first of these was an expan-
sion of the court's inquiry into the benefits allegedly conferred by
plaintiffs' action. In Sims and Allen the court had confined its exam-
ination to those benefits received by the class of persons actually in-
volved in the litigation; in Wyatt, on the other hand, the inquiry was
broadened to include a review of all societal benefits resulting from the
73. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). This action resulted from the ex-
pansion of an earlier suit of the same name which had been brought to upgrade the
standards of care and rehabilitative training available at an Alabama mental hospital.
See Wyatt v. Strickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
74. 344 F. Supp. at 409.
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action. This shift in approach is particularly evident in the court's
discussion of the specific benefits flowing from plaintiffs' suit:
By successfully prosecuting this suit, plaintiffs have benefitted not
only the present residents of Bryce, Partlow and Searcy but also
everyone who will be confined to these institutions in the future.
Veritably, it is no overstatement to assert that all of Alabama's
citizens have profited and will continue to profit from this litigation.
So prevalent are mental disorders in our society that no family is im-
mune from their perilous incursion. Consequently, the availabil-
ity of institutions capable of dealing successfully with such disorders
is essential and, of course, in the best interest of all Alabamians.7"
Secondly, in focusing exclusively upon the general societal bene-
fits of plaintiffs' action, Wyatt also stands for a movement away from
the strict requirement of vindicating congressional policy per se. That
is, the invocation of a federal statute which is supported by a "strong"
congressional policy would not appear to be necessary under the court's
rationale since the Wyatt suit apparently was predicated solely upon the
due process guarantees of the Constitution. Thus, Wyatt would seem
to reduce the determinative criterion for fee shifting under the private
attorney general doctrine to that of merely having provided a substan-
tial benefit to a broad section of the public.76
One final feature of Wyatt also should be noted. In concluding
its discussion of the "kind of benefit" theory, the court invoked the
unjust enrichment reasoning of the common fund cases:
[T]he expenses . . . incurred in vindicating the public good were
considerable. To burden only plaintiffs with these costs not only is
unfair but also is legally impermissible. . . . Considerations of
equity require that those who profit share the expense. In this case
the most logical way to spread the burden among those benefitted
is to grant attorneys' fees.77
Although the court failed to indicate the extent to which it relied upon
this unjust enrichment argument, this rationale would seem to be in-
tended as mere auxiliary support for the court's primary encourage-
ment-of-public-interest-litigation rationale. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that the court cited as authority Lee78 where, as in-
dicated above, attorneys' fees were assessed against a private party de-
fendant, so that there was no possible pretext of taxing the beneficiaries
75. Id.
76. Seemingly, under such an approach the enforcement of a statute embodying a
strong public policy would constitute but one of many possible avenues to achieving the
broad public benefit necessary to shift fees. For a further discussion of the advisa-
bility of such an approach see text accompanying notes 93-99 infra.
77. 344 F. Supp. at 409. Since a state agency was the defendant in this action, and
also the primary beneficiary of the suit, the state would have paid plaintiffs' attorneys'
costs regardless of which fee shifting rational the court ultimately used.
78. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
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for the costs of the suit. Looking to the court's primary rationale, then,
Wyatt clearly would seem to offer a simplified, all purpose approach
to the "private attorney general" doctrine.
Another case which quite recently has considered the new fee shift-
ing doctrine is La Raza Unida v. Volpe."2 In this action, decided Oc-
tober 19, 1972, plaintiffs sued to recover litigation expenses incurred in
an earlier action against the same defendants. In the prior case80 plain-
tiffs had brought a class action against, among others, the California
Department of Highways for failing to comply with certain federal stat-
utes in its pursuance of California Highway Project 238. Specifically,
plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants failed to file with the Secre-
tary of Transportation a statement relating to the environmental impact
of the highway project as required by various regulations issued pur-
suant to section 4(f) of the 1966 Department of Transportation Act,"'
and, further, that the state had violated various provisions of another
federal statute 2 by not having established an adequate relocation as-
sistance program for persons who would be displaced by the project.
Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, and the court enjoined further land
acquisition and resident removal in conjunction with the highway proj-
ect until defendants had complied with the statutory requirements.
In the subsequent action for attorneys' fees, Judge Peckham, after
concluding that neither the obdurate behavior rule nor the common
fund exception provided an appropriate rationale for shifting fees,
turned to the private attorney general concept. Citing Lee, Allen and
Sims as general authority, Judge Peckham articulated his version of the
rule as follows:
[W]henever there is nothing in a statutory scheme which might be
interpreted as precluding it, a "private attorney general" should be
awarded attorneys' fees when he has effectuated a strong Congres-
sional policy which has benefitted a large class of people, and
where further the necessary and financial burden of private enforce-
ment are such as to make the award essential.83
Applying these criteria to the actual facts of the case, Judge Peck-
ham first determined that a strong congressional policy had indeed been
effectuated. He asserted that "[tihe Court could cite numerous judi-
cial and legislative utterances that dramatically portray the strength of
these public policies," 4 and, to illustrate, he provided three examples.
79. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1972).
80. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
82. 23 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
83. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP at 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
1972).
84. Id. at 7.
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On environmental protection, he quoted from Justice Black's concur-
ring opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe8 5 to the ef-
fect that section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act repre-
sented "a solemn determination of the highest law-making body of this
nation" that public highways should not be allowed to encroach upon
park lands without a prior policy evaluation by the Secretary of Trans-
portation. 6 And, on relocation assistance, he quoted policy statements
from 23 U.S.C. section 501 and Title II of the Uniform Relocation As-
sistance Act 7 which indicate that it was Congress's desire to insure that
a few individuals do "not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of
programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole."88
The deficiency of these examples is that they do not "dramatically
portray" the strength of the policies in question; at most they merely
indicate that the policies exist in a degree sufficient to warrant legisla-
tion. Thus, if the court's intent was, in fact, to provide some criteria
or evidence which would justify differentiating federal statutes on the
basis of the relative strength of their respective policy goals, it would
not appear to have achieved its aim.
The second prerequisite for awarding fees suggested by the court
was that the action benefit a large class of people. In contrast to the
Sims and Allen requirement that the plaintiff specifically benefit the class
he represented, the La Raza court adopted, in effect, the Wyatt ap-
proach of looking to the benefit to society in general. Accordingly, in
finding that plaintiffs had also satisfied this requirement, the court
noted several forms of benefit devolving from plaintiffs' action such as:
the obvious benefit to "those 5000 people about to be uprooted from
their homes," the benefit to the "200,000 residents of Hayward, Union
City and Fremont" in being guaranteed that their parks will not be
destroyed until appropriate policy determinations are made, and the
state-wide "therapeutics" that result from the California Highway De-
partment's compliance with the federal statutes and regulations.89
Finally, the court turned to the questions of whether it was nec-
essary to spur private enforcement of the laws invoked by plaintiff, and,
if so, whether the financial burden on plaintiffs was sufficiently severe
to make an award of fees essential. Here again the court responded
affirmatively to both inquiries. The need for private enforcement was
85. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
86. Id. at 421.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1970).
88. This wording is used in both 23 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 4621
(1970).
89. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP at 8 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
19, 1972).
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present, the court suggested, "b]ecause of the limited resources and
potentially conflicting interests within and among governmental enti-
ties. . . ." Whenever such entities are involved as defendants, "only
private citizens can be expected to 'guard the guardians.' 91 As to the
need to alleviate the financial burden on plaintiffs, the court noted that:
exhortations toward citizen participation can sound somewhat hol-
low against the background of the economic realities of vigorous
litigation. In many "public interest" cases only injunctive relief is
sought, and the average attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not
shudder, at the thought of "taking on" an entity such as the Cali-
fornia Department of Highways, with no prospects of financial
compensation for the efforts and expenses rendered. The expense
of litigation in such cases poses a formidable, if not insurmounta-
ble, obstacle.92
Based on all of these findings, then, the court concluded that an award
of fees to plaintiff was appropriate as a means of effectuating strong
congressional policy.
Discussion: Achieving a Uniform Rule
In tracing the progression of cases from Piggie Park through La
Raza, it is readily apparent that a number of federal courts are quite
willing to accept and utilize the general concept of the private attorney
general as a basis for transferring the burden of litigation expenses.
What is also readily seen, however, is that to date the application of
this doctrine has been marked by a considerable amount of variation
and seeming confusion. Specifically, the cases have reflected wide
divergence as to (1) the underlying rationale of the doctrine-alter-
natively relying on "vindication of strong congressional policies," avoid-
ance of unjust enrichment, promotion of general "societal therapeu-
tics," or some combination thereof-and (2) the construction and de-
gree of significance to be accorded the requirement of a "need for pri-
vate enforcement." Some degree of judicial discordance undoubtedly
is inevitable at the inception of any new doctrine or principle of law.
Although such divergence manifests a healthy independence of thought
within the federal court system, it may be useful to essay a compre-
hensive formulation of the private attorney general fee shifting doctrine
in the hope of promoting a rule which is founded upon a sound analyti-
cal base and which concomitantly fosters a substantial degree of pre-
dictability in its application.
The initial task in attempting to devise such an all-purpose rule is
that of appropriately identifying its underlying purpose. As indicated
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id.
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above, the cases which have dealt with this task to date seemingly have
awarded attorneys' fees on the basis of three divergent, albeit over-
lapping, rationales, namely, encouraging the enforcement of strong con-
gressional policies, avoiding unjust enrichments and, most expansively,
encouraging the advancement of broad public interests.93
In looking toward the formulation of a single private attorney gen-
eral rule, it appears that only the last of these rationales offers a fully
workable policy base. The first rationale-encouraging the enforce-
ment of strong congressional policies-would seem unacceptable in that
it is both unnecessarily restrictive in one sense and overly broad in an-
other. It is unnecessary limited because it requires that the action be
brought pursuant to a federal statute. Such a requirement would seem
to imply that policies codified by federal statutes possess some unique
quality which makes them particularly suited to private enforcement.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive of what this quality might be, or
how it generally would distinguish such suits from public interest ac-
tions brought, for example, to vindicate constitutional rights which are
not otherwise codified.94 The Wyatt case appears to be directly in
point in this respect. There the highly commendable result achieved
by plaintiffs' suit rested solely upon the broad constitutional concept
of due process. Thus the award of fees in that case may not, in fact,
be attributed to the enforcement of congressional policy per se,93 but
must be said simply to have reflected the court's determination that the
plaintiffs' action was of such a socially desirable nature that similar
suits also should be encouraged.
The second deficiency of the encouragement-of-strong-congres-
sional-policies rationale is found in its apparent willingness to award
fees in all suits brought to enforce certain federal statutes, i.e., those
statutes allegedly infused with a strong congressional policy. The ob-
vious drawback of this failure to discriminate among individual cases
is that it may encourage the bringing of nuisance suits based upon mere
technical violations of the favored statutes. Such a result would be
93. This latter rationale would seem to accurately characterize the Wyatt deci-
sion for the reasons discussed in the text accompanying note 76 supra.
94. It is also difficult to see how suits predicated on federal statutes are generally
more deserving of attorneys' fees awards than many diversity suits which are based
upon state statutes or common law. Admittedly a ruling pursuant to a federal statute
has, in theory, nationwide legal significance. Yet, its practical significance may, due
to the uniqueness of the fact situation involved, be wholly confined to a particular state
or locality. Where this is the case, a diversity action involving state law conceivably
could achieve the same beneficial result and, hence, would appear to be just as de-
serving of an award of fees.
95. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Wyatt court, at one point in
its opinion, uses the phrase "national policy" in lieu of the standard term "Congres-
sional policy." 344 F. Supp. at 409.
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particularly unfortunate in the context of a rule supposedly designed
to promote pro bono publico actions.
The second rationale mentioned in the private attorney general
cases, that of avoiding unjust enrichment, also would seem to be an
unsuitable basis for a comprehensive rule. Although the avoidance of
unjust enrichment is certainly a valid policy consideration in itself,
applicability is found in cases where the defendant is the actual benefi-
ciary of the action,96 or where the court has jurisdiction over a fund
which allows it to assess the ultimate beneficiaries for plaintiff's costs
in bringing the suit. Because of this fact the only pro bono publico
actions in which this rationale could be utilized to shift fees would be
those in which the public, in the form of some governmental body or
public instrumentality, had been named as a party defendant. Un-
doubtedly a large proportion of pro bono suits would satisfy this re-
quirement, but there seems to be no valid reason for restricting the
private attorney general doctrine to only these actions. Moreover, the
ideal of the unjust enrichment principle-charging each beneficiary a
share of the litigation expenses proportionate to his gain-rarely will
be achieved in the private attorney general context to the degree which
it is in traditional common fund cases. That is, it is highly unlikely
that the benefits devolving from any particular pro-bono action will be
apportioned among the beneficiaries according to their relative contri-
butions to the public body involved in the suit.97  Thus it would seem
that the unjust enrichment consideration should, at most, serve as a
supplementary factor in determining whether the private attorney gen-
eral should be awarded fees.
The conclusion suggested by the above considerations is that the
courts should address themselves straightforwardly to the substantive
public benefits which a plaintiff's litigative efforts allegedly have pro-
vided. The award of attorneys' fees should not turn automatically
upon the invocation of certain federal statutes or upon the presence of
96. For a discussion of the common fund doctrine see text accompanying notes 9-
11 supra.
97. The La Raza case is a good example of this proposition. There, as indicated
previously, the court delineated the stratified benefits of the action as follows: the
"most immediate impact" being on "those 5000 people about to be uprooted from their
homes and deprived of the parks," lesser but "substantial benefits" accruing to the
200,000 residents of Hayward, Union City and Fremont from the increased protection
to their parks, the "very real impact" upon all citizens of the Bay Area in being pro-
tected from undue housing and environmental problems in connection with the high-
way project in question, and finally the benefit to all Californians of the increased
likelihood of state agency compliance with federal statutes and regulations. La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP at 8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1972). Clearly
there is no feasible way in which the costs of such an action could be transferred to the
beneficiaries in proportion to their relative gains,
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a public agency as a party defendant, but rather should depend in all
cases upon the actual societal benefits which may be said to have re-
sulted from the plaintiff's suit. This approach obviously would not pre-
clude giving appropriate weight to policies which are in fact qualita-
tively favored by society. Nonetheless it would obviate the spurious
shibboleth of purporting to find a strong congressional policy in any
particular statute.
The adoption of such a benefit analysis approach to pro bono fee
shifting would, in addition to avoiding the pitfalls and limitations of the
rationales discussed above, seem to provide other advantages as well.
For example, much of the conceptual confusion and waste of judicial
energy which has persisted to date would be eliminated by placing the
doctrine upon a simple and common sense footing. Also, it would open
the way for adoption of the private attorney general doctrine by the
state court systems.98 That is, much of the public interest litigation
which occurs in the state courts necessarily is based upon common law
principles and, hence, in these cases no ready analogy to the strong
congressional policy test would be present. "General public benefit,"
on the other hand, is a concept which works equally well in both state
and federal courts.
The second area of disharmony among the courts is that dealing
with the requirement of a need to encourage private enforcement.
This requirement is, of course, based upon the proposition that if no
such need exists in any particular case, then there is also no justifica-
tion for awarding attorney's fees under the private attorney general
doctrine. The problem presented is one of identifying those circum-
stances which effectively obviate the need to encourage private litiga-
tion. In this regard the courts have discussed two basic factors: the
adequacy of public enforcement and the likelihood that the suit would
have been brought regardless of the potential for a fee award. As to
the adequacy of public enforcement, the cases discussed above run the
gamut from Brewer-which declined to apply the private attorney gen-
eral doctrine on the ground that both the Department of Justice and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare were fully empowered to
enforce the specific statute in question9" (even though neither had in
fact intervened) -where fees were awarded despite the fact that the
United States was actually a plaintiff in a suit consolidated with the
action brought by the NAACP.
98. Although any discussion of state law is beyond the scope of this article it may
be noted that at least one California trial court recently has awarded attorneys' fees ex-
pressly upon the private attorney general rationale. See Mandel v. Hodges, No.
427816 (Alameda Super. Ct., Feb. 14, 1973).
99. 456 F.2d at 950 n.22.
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Viewing the question in a practical light it would seem that the
mere fact that various public agencies are empowered to enforce a par-
ticular law should not significantly influence the decision of whether
to award fees. The empowerment of a federal agency to bring suit
does not overcome the agency's inherent rstraints, noted in La Raza, of
limited funding'00 and, in some instances, conflicts of interest.10 1
The practical significance of these factors is reflected in several
of the closely analogous "standing" cases which recently have expanded
that concept in the context of suits and hearings affecting public inter-
ests. In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC,10 2 for example, where plaintiffs were found to have standing to
intervene in an FCC television license renewal hearing, the court noted
that the duties and jurisdiction of the FCC were vast and that the com-
mission itself had acknowledged its inability to oversee completely the
performance of every one of its thousands of licensees. In view of this
fact the court then observed:
The theory that the Commission can always effectively repre-
sent the listener interests without the aid and participation of legiti-
mate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys
general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with
so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear,
as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which
stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor
the Commission can continue to rely upon it.1°3
Seemingly, the only truly substantive consideration in regard to the
potential of public enforcement is that of avoiding duplicated effort.
It is patently unfair to a defendant to, in effect, make him pay twice
for a wasteful overlap of efforts by the government and private plain-
tiffs. To avoid this possibility, however, by refusing fees in every case
where the attorney general might have brought suit would be a solution
more severe than the problem. A far better approach would seem to lie
in employing some judicial means of efficiently coordinating the plain-
100. For a clear congressional acknowledgement of the limited funding problem in
the context of school desegregation enforcement see the quotation included in note 121
infra.
101. The most extreme example of a conflict of interest-where the public agency
charged with enforcing the particular law is named as a party defendant-ipso facto re-
quires that the suit be maintained by private interests. This situation has existed and
been judicially recognized in at least two of the recent private attorney general
cases, La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. 0-71-1166 RFP at 10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1972)
and Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972).
102. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
103. Id. at 1003-04. This acknowledgement of the practical limitations on public
law enforcement agencies would seem to reinforce the similar sentiments expressed by
Judge Winter's concurrence in Brewer. Compare the quotation accompanying note 60
supra.
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tiffs' efforts. This might be done, for example, by staying the private
attorney general's suit until the completion of the action brought by
the actual attorney general or other public enforcement entity or, al-
ternatively, by consolidating the respective suits.' Also, as a further
safeguard, the defendant might be allowed to show that a needless du-
plication of effort had in fact occurred and that the private attorney
general's award should be reduced accordingly.' 05 Either of these ap-
proaches seems preferable to an outright denial of fees on the highly
speculative pretext that the action eventually would have been brought
by the United States Attorney General.
Turning finally to the question of financial hardship on the plain-
tiff, the following points are worthy of note. First, the fact that a par-
ticular plaintiff is wealthy enough to absorb the cost of a public interest
law suit without serious detriment to his financial security should not
influence a court's decision of whether to award fees. Since the pur-
pose of the private attorney general doctrine is to encourage public
interest litigation, and since the cost of such suits generally outweighs
the resulting benefit to any single individual,'0 6 there would appear to
be no logical basis for excluding the wealthy from the ranks of the
would-be private attorneys general. 10 7
104. Consolidation in the federal courts is governed by Rule 42 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part: "When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
105. Cf., e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 467 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972); Henelopen
Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1966).
106. As pointed out by Judge Peckham in La Raza: "Absent foundation funding,
it is simply not economically rational for any single individual or small group of indi-
viduals, to attempt to capture their minute portion of aggregate good by incurring
large expense to enforce a widely held right." La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-
71-1166 RFP at 14 n.10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1972).
107. Where the plaintiff uses the gratis legal services of public interest or legal
aid attorneys who receive their operating expenses from either private or public sources
or both, two interrelated policy questions are raised: first, does the encouragement-of-
litigation rationale continue to have sufficient validity to justify the awarding of at-
torneys' fees and, if so, does it make any difference whether the legal organization re-
ceives its funding from public, as opposed to private, sources. These questions have
not as yet received adequate attention from the courts. Three recent cases, however,
do provide some insight into the initial, and apparently conflicting, responses which have
so far been made. In Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.
the court awarded fees to plaintiff's attorneys in spite of the fact that they had never
intended to charge plaintiffs for their services. The court stated that "[w]hat is re-
quired is not an obligation to pay attorney fees. Rather what-and all-that is re-
quired is the existence of a relationship of attorney and client, a status which is wholly
independent of compensation, as witness the effective service of counsel in the de-
fense of criminal cases, the assertion of post-conviction habeas remedies and now wide-
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On the other hand, a valid consideration would be whether a suf-
ficient private interest is promoted concurrently with the public interest
such that a court might conclude that the suit would have been brought
regardless of any alleged public-mindedness on the part of the plaintiff.
If such is the case, the additional incentive of transferred fees is not
necessary.
The Doctrine Is Placed in Issue: The Reversal
of Bradley v. School Board'
On November 29, 1972 Bradley v. School Board was reversed by
a two to one decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.109 This decision, the first to directly reject the private
attorney general doctrine as a proper basis for shifting attorneys' fees,
gives rise to a direct conflict among the federal courts,110 and, accord-
ingly, would seem to presage ultimate intervention by the Supreme
Court. Because of its unquestionable significance, and because it runs
contrary to the fee shifting rationale advocated in the preceding section,
the Bradley reversal clearly merits careful examination.
The majority opinion in Bradley is divided into three sections.
The first deals with the district court's reliance on the unreasonable
and obdurate conduct rule, the second is directed toward the private
spread organized services on behalf of the poor." Id. at 538-39. The full signifi-
cance of this holding is somewhat in doubt, however, since the court failed to indicate
whether the attorneys involved were publicly or privately financed. The broad language
and reasoning used by the court, though, would seem to be applicable in either case. In
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, Civ. No. C-71-1166 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1972), an award
of fees was made to a privately financed public interest law firm. Judge Peckham ob-
served that: "The fact that attorneys in this action ...require no fees from their
clients or that they receive tax-exempt foundation money is not germain to their status
as private attorneys-general. . . . We cannot presume Congress intended to rely on
tax-exempt foundations to fund costs of litigation in order to effectuate its policies,
nor that such funding will continue in the future." Id. at 13 n.6. Finally, in Ross v.
Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972), Judge King refused to grant fees to the plain-
tiff's attorneys, the Hawaii Legal Services Project, on the ground that they were a gov-
ernment-financed nonprofit organization and as such required no additional funding.
"Legal Services' attorneys can function as private attorneys-general irrespective of
whether this court awards them counsel fees. Indeed, this is one of the reasons under-
lying the establishment and funding of Legal Services Projects throughout the nation.
There is thus no 'necessity' for an award of fees within the text laid down by La Raza
Unida v. Volpe. . . ." Id. at 956.
108. The district court's opinion in Bradley is discussed at the text accompanying
notes 36-45 supra.
109. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1972).
110. For a list of the major cases and jurisdictions in which the private attor-
ney general doctrine has been adopted see note 1 supra.
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attorney general doctrine and the third construes the applicability of
the fee shifting provision of the recently enacted Emergency School
Aid Act.I' 1
In addressing itself first to the question of whether the school
board's litigative deportment might be characterized as being so unrea-
sonable and obdurate as to justify an award of attorneys' fees, the court
reviewed at some length the protracted course of the plaintiffs' suit and
concluded that the board's conduct had not, in fact, been sufficiently
culpable. 112
Bad Faith Revisited
The court next turned to the private attorney general doctrine
which had served as an "alternative ground" for the fees award in the
district court. In beginning its analysis, the court first suggested that
the lower court had apparently conditioned the doctrine's application
upon a finding that "the rights of the plaintiff were plain and the de-
fense manifestly without merit.""' 3  In other words, the court attrib-
uted to the district court a formulation of the private attorney general
doctrine which, in effect, incorporated the substance of the unreason-
able conduct rule."' On this construction the court simply referred to
its reasoning in the first section of its opinion and held that if this were
indeed the basis of the district court's holding, it did not support an
award of fees.
111. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235. The attorneys' fees provision of this act,
section 718, is quoted in note 122 infra.
112. The court summarized its findings as follows: "It is clear that the Board, in
attempting to develop a unitary school system for Richmond during 1970, was not op-
erating in an area where the practical methods to be used were plainly illuminated or
where prior decisions had not left a 'lingering doubt' as to the proper procedure to be
followed. Even the District Court had its uncertainties. All parties were awaiting the
decision of the Supreme Court in Swann [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971)]. Before Swann was decided, however, the parties were engaged in an
attempt to develop a novel method of desegregating the Richmond school system for
which there was not at the time legal precedent. Nor can it be said that there was not
some remaining confusion, at least at the District level, about the scope of Swann itself.
The frustrations of the District Court in its commendable attempt to arrive at a school
plan that would protect the constiutional rights of the plaintiffs and others in their
class, are understandable, but, to some extent, the School Board itself was also frustrated.
It seems to us unfair to find under these circumstances that it was unreasonably obdur-
ate." Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327 (4th Cir. 1972).
113. Id.
114. The court expressly admits this fact: "If this is the basis for the [lower]
Court's alternative ground, it really does not differ from the rule that has heretofore been
followed consistently by this Court that, where a defendant defends in bad faith or in
defiance of law, equity will award attorney's fees." Id. at 328.
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The court's error in considering such a formulation of the doc-
trine is manifest. In the first place, such a rule would be entirely su-
perfluous; once a finding of bad faith had been made there would be
no need to consider further questions of public policy since an award
of fees would already be justified under the unreasonable and vexatious
conduct rule. Moreover, the district court's opinion quite clearly pre-
cludes any such interpretation of its "alternative ground."
The private lawyer in [school desegregation suits] most accurately
may be described as a "private attorney general." Whatever the
conduct of defendants may have been, it is intolerably anomolous
that [such] counsel . . . should be compelled to look to himself
or to private individuals for the resources needed to make his
proof.115
Attack on the Private Attorney General Doctrine
Conceding that its initial interpretation might not accurately rep-
resent the district court's holding, the court next considered the private
attorney general doctrine in a more realistic light, i.e., with no addi-
tional bad faith requirement. After reviewing various arguments and
cases the court concluded that "if [fee] awards are to be made to pro-
mote the public policy expressed in legislative action, they should be
authorized by 'Congress and not by the courts.""' 6  The court prof-
fered three basic arguments in support of its ruling: (1) there was
evidence that Congress did not intend attorneys' fees to be awarded in
school desegregation cases, (2) the Mills and Lee decisions were inap-
posite to the present proceeding and (3) in any event, the private at-
torney general rule was not an appropriate judicial doctrine since it
encroached upon the legislative sphere of governmental activity.117
A Finding of Implied Legislative Intent
As to the purported finding of an implicit intention on the part
of Congress to deny the recovery of attorneys' fees in school desegre-
gation cases the court made two specific offerings of evidence. The
court first pointed out that legislation which would have authorized such
fee shifting was introduced in Congress in 1971, as part of a bill de-
signed to assist in the integration of schools, but was not favorably
acted upon. In addition, the court pointed to the Civil Rights Act of
1964118 and indicated that "it expressly provided for such [a fee]
award in both the equal employment opportunity and the public ac-
115. 53 F.R.D. at 42 [emphasis added].
116. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1972).
117. Id. at 328-29.
118. The relevant provisions of this act are included in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000
(h) (1970).
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commodation sections but pointedly omitted to include such a provi-
sion in the public education section."119
Although these arguments appear somewhat persuasive on their
face,121 closer analysis reveals their utter lack of probative force. The
legislation which was introduced in Congress in 1971 apparently was
never acted upon in a manner which might justify an inference that
Congress had any serious reservations concerning the advisability of
allowing fees to prevailing plaintiffs in school integration actions. 121
In fact, this very bill, along with its attorneys' fees provision, ulti-
mately was carried into the 1972 session of Congress and enacted Title
VII, "Emergency School Aid Act," of the Education amendments of
1972.122 Secondly, with respect to the omission of a fees provision
119. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 328 (4th Cir. 1972).
120. In light of Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714
(1967), it can hardly be doubted that legislative action which implicitly manifests a
clear intent to restrict the availability of attornyes' fees awards will be recognized as
such and given effect by the courts. The crucial inquiry which arises in this regard is
whether the legislative action in question actually indicates a clear and unambiguous in-
tent to restrict the court's fee shifting powers.
121. This opinion was expressed by Mr. Richard Smith, associate counsel to the
Senate Subcommittee on Education, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, in a phone
conversation with the author on February 3, 1973.
As to the underlying rationale of the attorneys' fees provision itself, the following
explanation was offered in a Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report:
"[School desegregation] laws are not now being enforced throughout the nation.
The Federal government is devoting neither the time, effort nor the financial resources
necessary for adequate law enforcement. For example, the budget of the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Rights Division for education activities amounts to only $1 million a
year. Only six school desegregation suits have been brought in Northern and Western
states by the Justice Department. Only nine school districts in Northern and Western
states have been required to file desegregation plans under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The Committee believes that funds should be made available to assure that
Federal laws will be enforced throughout the country, while at the same time, under
the policies and programs set forth in this bill, voluntary efforts to achieve quality edu-
cation in stable integrated environments are assisted throughout the nation.
"Although litigation directed toward the enforcement of these laws is often time
consuming and therefore expensive, litigation on behalf of those injured by breach of
legal requirements remains the most effective and economical method of which the Com-
mittee is aware to obtain protection of legal rights." S. RaP. No. 92-61, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 25 (1971).
122. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235. Section 718 of this act, relating to at-
torney fees, provides as follows: "Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the
United States against a local educational agency, a State (or any agency thereof), or
the United States (or agency thereof), for failure to comply with any provision of
this title or for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in viola-
tion of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States as they pertain to elementary and secondary education,
the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring
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in the public education section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,123 the
simple explanation appears to be that this section does not contemplate
private actions but merely enables the United States attorney general
to bring desegregation actions on behalf of persons he feels are unable
to initiate their own suits."24 Accordingly, there is no reason for this
section to provide for awarding attorney's fees to private plaintiffs.'25
An Attempt to Distinguish Mills and Lee
The court's next argument was that neither Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co. 2 6 nor Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp. 27 was authority for
awarding fees in the fact situation presented in Bradley. Any reliance
on Mills, the court said, was misplaced "'because conferral of benefits,
not policy enforcement, was the Mills Court's stated justification for its
holding.'. . . In fact, the award in Mills was based on the same con-
cept of benefit as was used to support the award in Trustees v. Green-
ough. . .,28
These assertions do not appear to be well-founded. First, the de-
cision in Mills was precisely that the federal courts, in their application
of the common fund doctrine, were justified in departing from the
Greenough requirement of a pecuniary benefit so as to require only
that the benefit conferred be of a substantial nature. 29 Second, the
distinction which the Bradley court draws between "conferral of bene-
fits" and "policy enforcement" in Mills is largely illusory since the prin-
cipal benefit conferred in that case was, in fact, the enforcement of
public policy.' 0 It would appear, then, that the only conceptual fea-
ture of Mills which prevents it from being direct authority for an award
of fees in Bradley is the fact that, at least formally, Mills spoke in terms
about compliance, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
This provision had been modified from the form in which it was originally intro-
duced which would have assessed plaintiffs' fees against the federal government rather
than the defendant.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1970).
124. Private desegregation actions apparently are almost always brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
125. The public accommodations and equal employment opportunity sections, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a and 2000e respectively, on the other hand, expressly provide for pri-
vate actions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a) and 2000e-5(e) (1970).
126. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
127. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
128. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), quoting Note, 50
TEXAS L. Rsv. 204, 207 (1971).
129. See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 34 supra,
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of the fund theory and its appurtenant unjust enrichment rationale.1 31
This obstacle, however, seemingly was overcome by the Fourth Circuit
itself in Brewer v. School Board. 3 2  That is, if one were to combine
the quasi-fund theory of Brewer 131 with the substantial benefit test of
Mills, there seemingly would exist a legal apparatus which would wholly
justify an award of fees in Bradley.134  Nonetheless, the court failed
to utilize this unique potential provided by its earlier decision.
The Bradley court's dismissal of Lee is equally unconvincing. In
essence the court's argument was that the Lee court had justified its
award of fees by noting that there existed a federal statute which au-
thorized fee awards in suits closely parallel to the action before it, and
that by analogy, fees should also be allowed in that action.' 35 In con-
trast to the Lee situation, the Bradley court implied that there was no
statute allowing attorneys' fees to be shifted in school desegregation ac-
tions to which the court could analogize the action before it.
The deficiency of this summary dismissal of Lee is that it fails to
treat the true breadth of the Lee rationale. The statutory analogy argu-
ment was but one pillar of the Lee holding. The Lee court also relied
upon Mills, construing it in exactly the sense which the Bradley court
refused to, and upon Piggie Park.3 ' These portions of Lee, which did,
in fact, provide direct authority for an award of fees in Bradley, were
entirely ignored by the court.
Congressional Silence and Separation of Power
The final arguments in Bradley were aimed directly at the roots
of the private attorney general doctrine:
If, however, the rationale of Mills is to be stretched so as to
provide a vehicle for establishing judicial power justifying the em-
131. The substance of even this distinction is questionable, however, since Mills is
readily susceptible of a pure policy enforcement interpretation in spite of its formal ad-
herence to the fund doctrine. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
132. 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1972). This case is discussed in the text accom-
panying notes 53-61 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
134. The argument would run simply that instead of providing plaintiffs' class
with the benefit of free transportation, as was the case in Brewer, the plaintiffs in
Bradley had conferred upon their class the "substantial benefit" of accelerated desegre-
gation, or, in other words, the enforcement of the policies inherent in the equal protec-
tion clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and hence, under the quasi-fund theory they
were entitled to receive attorneys' fees from the school board.
135. For a discussion of this portion of the Lee opinion see notes 49-51 and ac-
companying text supra.
136. These aspects of Lee are discussed in the text accompanying notes 47, 48 and
52 supra.
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ployment of award of attorney's fees to promote and encourage
private litigation in support of public policy as expressed by Con-
gress or embodied in the Constitution, it will launch courts upon
the difficult and complex task of determining what is public policy,
an issue normally reserved for legislative determination, and, even
more difficult, which public policy warrants the encouragement of
award of fees to attorneys for private litigants who voluntarily take
upon themselves the character of private attorneys-general.1 3 7
In addition, the court contended that "[c]ourts should not assume that
Congress legislates in ignorance of existing law . ." ."I8 Rather, they
should interpret Congress's failure to provide for fee awards under any
particular statute as constituting a purposeful expression of legislative
intent that such awards "should be allowed only as they may be au-
thorized under the traditional and long established principles. .. ,,"
These pronouncements by the Bradley majority would seem to
raise two fundamental questions: (1) Should federal courts regard
legislative silence as a constraint against implementing any new fee
shifting rationales, and (2) if not, should the courts still refrain from
implementing the private attorney general rationale on the ground that
it entails policy determinations which are more properly left to Con-
gress? It is urged that each of these questions should be answered in
the negative.
Inferring a legislative mandate based on Congress's failure to ex-
press itself would seem to entail a wholly unwarranted abdication of
power which has long been recognized as properly residing within the
federal judiciary. None of the leading cases which have discussed the
inherent jurisdiction of the federal courts to award fees has ever sug-
gested that this power is arbitrarily circumscribed, or that having once
been an organic and flexible source of judicial authority it is now a
mere collection of a few petrified rules. Indeed, as discussed earlier
in this note, federal courts had undertaken considerable departures
from the traditional fee-shifting exceptions even prior to the private
attorney general doctrine.' 40  Thus, it would seem that the reasoning
137. Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972).
138. Id. at 330.
139. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 12-34 suprh. Another case which clearly dem-
onstrates the courts' willingness to depart from traditional fee-shifting exceptions when
considerations of equity warrant it, and which, interestingly enough was decided by
the Fourth Circuit, is Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
There, black employees of defendant railroad company brought suit against the railroad
and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, a labor union, for negotiat-
ing a contract which allegedly prejudiced the continued employment of black firemen.
The contract was in fact found to be racially discriminatory and hence void. In de-
creeing the relief to which plaintiffs were cntitled the court upheld the lower court's
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of the Bradley court could be applied just as persuasively to reach a
directly opposite conclusion. That is, assuming that Congress does in-
deed act with full awareness of existing legal precedent, it arguably fol-
lows that legislative silence indicates, if anything, an intent to give full
reign to the demonstrated expansiveness of the court's fee shifting pow-
ers.
The remaining question, then, is whether the courts should, as a
matter of judicial discretion, refrain from implementing the private at-
torney general doctrine. The Bradley court suggests that they should
on the ground that the doctrine allegedly requires the courts to make
two types of policy determinations which are better left to Congress:
namely, which laws effectuate public policy per se and which of such
laws warrant the enforcement incentive of a fees award. This argu-
ment, however, would not appear to be particularly persuasive. To
begin with, it is difficult to see how encouraging the enforcement of
laws which by definition reflect public policy "as expressed by Con-
gress or embodied in the Constitution" entails an independent determi-
nation by the courts as to the existence of such policies. Indeed, the
simple fact remains that since all federal laws embody public policy,
the vindication of any such law operates, to some greater or lesser ex-
tent, to advance the public interest. 14 1  Hence, no judicial inquiry into
the existence of public policy per se would seem to be involved in the
determination of whether to award fees under the private attorney gen-
eral doctrine.
It is true, of course, that the doctrine does require the courts to
weigh and balance the conflicting policies which inhere in its applica-
award of attorneys' fees. The court stated that: "Ordinarily, of course, attorneys' fees,
except as fixed by statute, should not be taxed as part of the costs recovered by the pre-
vailing party; but in a suit in equity where the taxation of such costs is essential
to the doing of justice, they may be allowed in exceptional cases. The justification here
is that plaintiffs of small means have been subjected to discriminatory and oppressive
conduct by a powerful labor organization which was required, as bargaining agent,
to protect their interests. The vindication of their rights necessarily involves greater
expense in the employment of counsel to institute and carry on extended and impor-
tant litigation than the amount involved to the individual plaintiffs would justify their
paying. In such situation, we think that the allowance of counsel fees in a reasonable
amount as a part of the recoverable costs of the case is a matter resting in the sound
discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 481. It is apparent that this rationale comes
within none of the traditional exceptions to the general rule, but rather is concerned
only with basic principles of equity.
141. Cf. Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto Lite
Co., 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 334 (1971). Such benefit to the public at large may, of
course, be found in any of several forms: for example, in the deterence of similar viola-
tions of the law, in the clarification of vague and ambiguous legal rights and duties, or
in the substantive therapeutics resulting from the individual suit.
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tion, that is, the relative benefit accruing to the public from a particular
type of law suit, on the one hand, and the general policy against fee
shifting, on the other. This task, however, seems far more suited to
the judicial branch of government than to the legislature. That is, con-
gressional power is necessarily limited to providing for fees in broad ge-
neric terms. Therefore, any legislative action aimed at using attor-
neys' fees to promote pro bono publico litigation would be confined to
either providing for mandatory fee awards under specific statutes,
which, in effect, would predetermine that all suits brought pursuant to
that statute were worthy of special enforcement, or requiring the courts
to determine, in their discretion, which action merited fee awards.
The former alternative is of limited utility since statutes rarely are
drafted in a way which guarantees that all suits brought under their
auspices will promote the public interest to a certain predetermined de-
gree. Moreover, this alternative would be even less useful in regard to
broad, uncodified provisions of the Constitution. The concept of due
process, for example, encompasses a range of potential actions far too
expansive to be codified in a statute which, in effect, would predeter-
mine that all due process suits were entitled to enhanced enforcement
at the expense of the defendant. 4 ' The second legislative alternative,
that of authorizing the courts to shift fees in their discretion does no
more than expressly place the burden of determining which suits jus-
tify fee awards where in most instances it must ultimately reside, i.e.,
with the courts. Thus it would appear that neither of the policy de-
terminations which the Bradley court characterizes as being "normally
reserved for legislative determination" poses a substantial obstacle to
the private attorney general doctrine. The first determination-that of
which laws promote public policy-is in fact made by the legislature
(or, alternatively, is embodied in the Constitution), and the second-
that of which suits have sufficiently advanced the public interest to
justify the transferring of plaintiff's legal expenses to the defendant-
in most instances must be made by the courts.
In light of the above discussion, then, it would seem that the
Fourth Circuit's repudiation of the private attorney general doctrine in
Bradley is both an unsupported and unfortunate ruling which hope-
fully will not be followed.
Conclusion
The emergence of the private attorney general doctrine marks an
extremely auspicious development within the federal court system.
Firmly established on the traditional chancery powers of the federal
142. Compare the text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
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courts and motivated by strong considerations of equity, this doctrine
provides the means by which private citizens may surmount the finan-
cial obstacle which has long impeded the bringing of actions designed
primarily to protect broad public interests. Hopefully, the shadow
which has been cast by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Bradley will be
eradicated by the Supreme Court. If so, the door will have been
opened on a far healthier and more invigorated society.
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